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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE UNITED NATIONS





During the midst of the Iranian hostage crisis, and shortly before
the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in late December of 1979,
President Carter's National Security Affairs advisor, Dr. Zbigniew
Brzezinski, reportedly refused to rule out the possibility of the United
States using military force in reaction to or preemption of efforts by
hostile elements to block access to needed natural resources.' It is
probable that Brzezinski's implied warning was solely for the edifica-
tion of the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly he feared the Soviet Union
would perceive the antipathy between the United States and Iran as
providing an ideal opportunity for making inroads in the oil-rich Per-
sian Gulf region. Given the nature of the warning, however, it seems
also to have encompassed efforts by hostile governments of countries
where vitally important natural resources are located. Whether
Brzezinski's implied warning reflects the policy of the Reagan adminis-
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For the views of several Congressmen on the general issue of the use of military force against, inter
alia, efforts by indigenous elements to cut off access to certain resources see Should the United
States Use Force in the Persian Gulf, Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 1980, at A-27, col. 1. Former President
Carter never went quite as far as Dr. Brzezinski. In his 1980 State of the Union message, he spoke
only of a Soviet military invasion of the Persian Gulf and the possibility of American military
response. See Walsh, Somber Speech Lashes Soviets, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1980, at A-1, col. S.
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tration may be open to question, but it is, nevertheless, clear that it has
served to recrudesce the controversy over whether the United Nations
Charter, as a matter of law, precludes the use of military force against
economic coercion. This controversy derives from the Charter's au-
thorization of unilateral resort to military force only when legitimately
undertaken in self-defense pursuant to article 51, which speaks simply
in terms of self-defense against "armed" attack.2
This Paper suggests that the two traditional positions3 regarding
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it seems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
3. One school of thought contends that the terms of the Charter preclude the use of force
while the other contends that it does not. Those who contend that the terms of the Charter pre-
clude the use of force include: H. KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1950); Kunz, Individ-
ual and Collective Sejf-Defense inArticle 51 of the Charter of/he United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
872 (1947); Tucker, The Interpretation of War Under Present International Law, 4 INT'L L.Q. 29
(1951). Kelsen states that the right of self-defense applies only in case of an armed attack and that
the right of self-defense must not be exercised in case of any other violation of the legally pro-
tected interests of a United Nations member. H. KELSEN, supra, at 797-98. Kunz states:
Self-defense in municipal law presupposes an illegal attack; this is certainly true also
in international law...
"Armed attack" as the only condition of the right of self-defense under Art. 51 may,
in conceivable circumstances, mean too little. For this right does not exist against any
form of aggression which does not constitute "armed attack."... The threat of aggres-
sion does not justify self-defense under Art. 51.
Kunz, supra, at 877-78.
Those who contend that the Charter does not preclude the use of force in extreme situations
include: D. BowETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958); L. GOODRICH & E. HAM-
BRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (2d rev. ed. 1949); McDougal & Feliciano, LegalRegula-
tion of Resort to International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68
YALE LJ. 1057 (1959). Bowett states with respect to the view that a state may not avail itself of
self-defense against economic coercion:
The reasoning behind this view is that "the Charter forbids any use of force on the part
of the individual Members except for the exercise of the right of self-defence against an
armed attack." With respect, this statement is inaccurate and misleading, for the rele-
vant prohibition is Art. 2(4) which contains no prohibition of the exercise of self-defence
as permitted under the general law ....
D. BowErr, supra, at 188. Goodrich and Hambro state:
The provisions of Article 51 do not necessarily exclude the right of self-defense in situa-
tions not covered by this Article. If the right of self-defense is inherent as has been
claimed in the past, then each Member retains the right subject only to such limitations
as are contained in the Charter.
L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, supra, at 301. McDougal and Feliciano state:
In particular connection with exercises emphasizing nonmilitary forms of attack, we
have suggested that, in many contexts, the use of political, economic and ideological
instrumentalities may indeed result in no more than a modest degree of coercion, a de-
gree which may constitute part of the ordinary coercion implicit in the power and other
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 17 [1981], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol17/iss3/5
1982] INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COERCION
whether the Charter precludes unilateral resort to force in self-defense
against economic coercion should be rejected. Instead, it is argued, the
Charter does not, as a matter of law, preclude a state from unilaterally
resorting to military force against intense economic coercion so long as
it has first sought and been unsuccessful in obtaining the peaceful elim-
ination of the coercion through negotiation, consultation, and Security
Council action under Chapter VI of the Charter. Of course, since the
invocation of the inherent right of self-defense provided for in article
51 must be "necessary", and the quantum and nature of the defensive
force utilized by the state invoking article 51 must be "proportionate"
to the coercion exerted, rarely will economic coercion justify resort to
military rather than some other form of defensive force.
Given the limited scope of this Paper, no attempt will be made to
list the types of economic coercion which, if exerted, would justify re-
sort to military force in self-defense.' Such an undertaking would be
speculative at best. Similarly, no effort will be made to determine
whether the Charter authorizes the use of military force in self-defense
value processes in the world arena. To say, however, that article 51 limits the appropri-
ate precipitating event for lawful self-defense to an "armed attack" is in effect to suppose
that in no possible context can applications of nonmilitary types of coercion (where
armed force is kept to a background role) take on efficacy, intensity and proportions
comparable to those of an "armed attack" and thus present an analogous condition of
necessity. Apart from the extreme difficulty of establishing realistic factual bases for that
supposition, the conclusion places too great a strain upon the single secondary factor of
modality-military violence. A rational appraisal of necessity demands much more than
simple ascertainment of the modality of the initiating coercion. The expectations which
the contending participants create in each other are a function not only of the simple fact
that the military instrument has or has not been overtly used but also of the degree and
kind of use to which all other instrumentalities of policy are being put. What must be
assessed is the cumulative impact of all the means of coercion utilized; policy-oriented
analysis must be confiurative analysis. The kind, intensity and dimension of political,
economic or ideological pressure applied may, through this analysis, serve in some con-
texts as relevant indices of the imminence or remoteness of an allegedly expected armed
attack.
McDougal & Feliciano, supra, at 1150 (emphasis in original).
4. This Paper does not purport to enumerate the kinds of economic coercion which would
justify the resort to military force in self-defense. The complexity and perhaps futility of any such
task is demonstrated by examining the hypothetical factual situations presented infra in note 62.
Each of these draws into focus some of the factors which must be considered when attempting to
determine whether the economic coercion creates the necessity for defensive action and whether
defensive action which is military in nature is proportionate to the coercion precipitating its use.
It should be noted that even though one may not be justified in using military force against a
certain form of violative economic coercion, some other form of defensive force may be appropri-
ate. Thus, the use of economic force against violative economic coercion may be lawful in in-
stances where the principles of necessity and proportionality would not warrant resort to defensive
military action.
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against "imminent" exertions of intense economic coercion.-
5. Whenever the coercion sought to be preempted is economic rather than armed, the de-
bate surrounding the legitimacy of the use of anticipatory military force becomes more complex.
For the view that anticipatory self-defense against imminent exertion of armed coercion is
prohibited see 1. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275-79
(1963); Leitel, 7he United Nations Charter as a Restraint Upon a Nation's Right to Wage War, 36
BROOKLYN L. PEv. 212, 226-27 (1970). Brownlie states:
The Article [51] states that the right of self-defense remains unimpaired "if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." It is believed that the
ordinary meaning of the phrase precludes action which is preventive in character ....
In this respect the French text is less equivocal than the English since its literal transla-
tion would read "in a case where a United Nations Member is the object of an armed
aggression." The Spanish text simply reads "en caso de ataque armado." There is no
further clarification of the phrase to be gained from study of the travauxpreparatoires.
However, the discussions at San Francisco assumed that any permission for the unilat-
eral use of force would be exceptional and would be secondary to the general prohibition
in Article 2, paragraph 4. There was a presumption against self-defense and even action
in self-defense within Article 51 was made subject to control by the Security Council. In
these circumstances the precision of Article 51 is explicable. The comments of govern-
ments on Chapter VIII, section C, of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal give no real assist-
ance. A Turkish comment referred to "cases of emergency" but later spoke of "the
country being attacked"; and a comment by the Czechoslovak delegation referred to
"cases of immediate danger."
I. BROWNLIE, supra, at 275-79. For the opposite proposition see McDougal & Feliciano, supra
note 3:
The major difficulties with this reading of what appears to be an inept piece of
draftsmanship are two-fold. In the first place, neither article 51 nor any other word
formula can have, apart from context, any single "clear and unambiguous" or "popular,
natural and ordinary" meaning that predetermines decision in infinitely varying particu-
lar controversies. The task of treaty interpretation, especially the interpretation of con-
stitutional documents devised, as was the United Nations Charter, for the developing
future, is not one of discovering and extracting from isolated words some mystical pre-
existent, reified meaning but rather one of giving that meaning to both words and acts, in
total context, which is required by the principal, general purposes and demands pro-
jected by the parties to the agreement. For determining these major purposes and de-
mands, a rational process of interpretation permits recourse to all available indices of
shared expectation, including, in particular, that which Professor Kunz casually de-em-
phasized, the preparatory work on the agreement. Such a process of interpretation
would, moreover, seek to bring within the attention frame of the interpreter and applier
not just one element of a context suggested by one rule or principle of interpretation,
such as that upon which Dr. Nineic' relied, but all the relevant variable factors of a
particular context. It is of common .record in the preparatory work on the Charter that
article 51 was not drafted for the purpose of deliberately narrowing the customary-law
permission of self-defense against a current or imminent unlawful attack by raising the
required degree of necessity.
Id at 1145 (footnotes omitted). For additional support for the position taken by McDougal and
Feliciano see Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, A Study of some Recent Cases, 103
REcuEIL DES CouRs 342, 361-63 (1961). Bowett states:
It is not believed, therefore, that Art. 51 restricts the traditional right of self-defence
so as to exclude action taken against an imminent danger but before 'an armed attack
occurs'. In our view such a restriction is both unnecessary and inconsistent with Art. 2(4)
which forbids not only force but the threat of force, and, furthermore, it is a restriction
which bears no relation to the realities of a situation which may arise prior to an actual
armed attack and call for self-defence immediately if it is to be any avail at all. No state
can be expected to await an initial attack which, in the present state of armaments, may
well destroy the state's capacity for further resistance and so jeopardize its very existence.
D. BowETr, supra note 3, at 191-92. The view that a state may respond to imminent threat of
4
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II. USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST
EXERTIONS OF ECONOMIC COERCION
To cogently argue that the Charter does not, as a matter of law,
preclude the use of military force against exertions of economic coer-
cion, one must demonstrate that intense economic coercion violates ar-
ticle 2(4) of the Charter6 and that the precise terms of article 51 do not
restrict the exercise of the right of self-defense to only those situations
where an "armed" attack occurs. Clearly, since the exercise of the right
of self-defense presupposes the existence of some violative or imper-
missible activity against which it may be directed, any resort to force in
self-defense against economic coercion would be unlawful if economic
coercion itself could not be said to violate the proscription of article
2(4). Similarly, although intense economic coercion may be considered
violative of article 2(4), if article 51 restricts the exercise of the right of
self-defense to those instances where an "armed" attack occurs, resort
to force in self-defense against intense economic coercion would, itself,
violate the Charter. Such a violation would entitle the state against
which force has been used to respond lawfully with its own defensive
measures.7 What follows addresses both of these matters.
A. Economic Coercion as a Violation of the Charter
Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits "the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of another
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."' Arguably, the term "force" should be read broadly,
since it is located in article 2 rather than in article 19 of the Charter.
attack is also approved in The Caroline Case, 2 I. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 217 (1906).
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
7. If the Charter, as a matter of law, permits the use of force in self-defense only in instances
where a state has first been the object of an "armed attack", then using force in any other instance
would never be consonant with the Charter. The result would be that in every instance where
state A used military force against state B, which previously exerted some form of coercion which
was not armed, state A would be unable to justify the use of military force on the basis of the right
of self-defense, and state B would be lawfully entitled to resort to military force in self-defense
against state A.
8. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (emphasis added).
9. U.N. CHARTER art. 1 provides:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
1982]
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Article 2 sets out the principles in accordance with which the members
of the international community must act while article 1, in stating the
purposes of the collective community under the auspices of the United
Nations, prohibits "threats to the peace," "breaches of the peace," and
"acts of aggression." This reading suggests that the proscription of
force includes, but is not limited to, threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression,10 and, therefore, might also include cer-
tain other forms of intense coercion.
Nevertheless, many have contended that for other reasons the
Charter concept of force does not encompass economic coercion, re-
gardless of its intensity. The reasons advanced in support of this con-
tention include:
1. The delegates to the 1945 San Francisco Conference on
International Organization rejected a Brazilian proposal
to amend the original draft of article 2(4) to include in the
prohibition "the threat or use of economic measures" in
any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations; 1
2. the inability of the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the Gen-
eral Assembly and the Special Committees of 195312 and
195611 to develop a definition of aggression which in-
cluded economic coercion, as well as the absence of eco-
nomic coercion from the Consensus Definition of
aggression embodied in General Assembly Resolution
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures
to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these
common ends.
10. In another context, one commentator has gone so far as to suggest that the principles of
article 2 are superior to the purposes of the U.N. as stated in article 1. See Watson, Autointerpreta.
tion, Competence, and the Continuing Validity ofArticle 2(7) of the UN Charter, 71 AM. J. INT'L L.
60, 71 (1977). For a criticism of this view, see Letter from Professor Jordan J. Paust to Editor in
Chief, American Journal of International Law, June 16, 1977, reprinted in 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 749
(1977).
11. Doc. 784, 1/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 331, 334-35 (1945).
12. Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 9 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 11) at 1-15, U.N. Doc. A/2638 (1954).
13. Report of the 1956 Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 12 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 1-33, U.N. Doc. A/3574 (1956).
[Vol. 17:487
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3314 of 1974; 14
3. since article 51 of the Charter permits resort to the right of
self-defense only when an "armed" attack occurs, 5 any
reading of article 2(4) which characterizes certain forms
of economic coercion as impermissible creates a lacuna in
the Charter whereby a state would not be entitled to in-
voke article 51 to defend itself against exertions of imper-
missible coercion; 6
4. since no one contends that article 2(4) is designed to re-
strict economic competition, a reading of the term "force"
so as to include economic coercion creates the inordi-
nately difficult and politically sensitive problem of having
to distinguish permissible economic competition from im-
permissible economic coercion. 17
Upon close analysis, none of these arguments prove convincing enough
to require that the term "force" be read as precluding intense forms of
economic coercion.
The delegates' rejection of the Brazilian proposal at the Confer-
ence on International Organization deserves some weight. It is difficult
to say categorically, however, that the rejection evidences the aversion
of the delegates to the assimilation of any form of economic coercion to
the force prohibited by article 2(4).18 Significantly, during the debates
on the Brazilian proposal the Belgian delegate suggested that the pro-
posal underestimated the reach of the phrase "'or in any other man-
ner ' 19 inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations," which
appeared then, and still appears, at the end of the text of article 2(4).
Under this reasoning a strong argument can be made that the Brazilian
proposal was rejected because it simply restated that which was already
provided. This argument appears corroborated by the language in the
Report of Rapporteur of Committee I to Commission I to the effect
that "unilateral use of force or similar coercive measures is not author-
ized or admitted" by the terms of article 2(4).20 The use of the words
14. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1974). For a
discussion of Resolution 3314, see Stone, Hopes and Loopholes In The 1974 Defnition ofAggres-
sion 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 224 (1977).
15. Supra note 2. The accuracy of this construction is explored infra in the text accompany-
ing notes 39-50.
16. See 20 U.N. GAOR Annexes (Agenda Item Nos. 90, 94) at 88, U.N. Docs. A/546 (1965).
17. See Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality Under Article 2(4) of
the Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 983, 996 (1974).
18. Doc. 784, 1/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 331, 334-35 (1945).
19. Id at 334.
20. Doc. 885, 1/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 387, 400 (1945) (emphasis added).
1982]
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"or similar coercive measures," in juxtaposition to the term "force,"
seems to indicate that article 2(4) should not be read in a manner which
precludes even intense forms of economic coercion from being consid-
ered impermissible.
With respect to the significance attributed to the failure of the
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and the Special Committees
of 195321 and 195622 to define aggression to include economic coercion,
combined with the absence of economic coercion from the Consensus
Definition of aggression in General Assembly Resolution 3314 of
1974,23 it need only be noted that, whenever the focus of attention is the
question of the impermissibility of certain forms of economic coercion
under the Charter, the appropriate concern is the more inclusive term
"force" and not the limited term "aggression." "Aggression" is used
only in article 1(1) of Chapter 124 of the Charter, which states thepur-
poses of the United Nations, and article 39 of Chapter VII,25 which sets
out the instances activating the jurisdictional competency of the Secur-
ity Council to take collective security actions. Therefore, the exact con-
tent of an acceptable comprehensive definition of aggression has
significance only in those contexts. 26 The fact that early efforts to de-
fine aggression as including economic coercion proved unsuccessful,
and that the recently adopted Consensus Definition of aggression fails
to include economic coercion, seem to have some bearing on the nature
of the action the Security Council is authorized to undertake in dealing
21. Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 9 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 11) at 1-15, U.N. Doc. A/2638 (1954).
22. Report of the 1956 Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 12 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No 16) at 1-33, U.N. Doc. A/3574 (1956).
23. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1. For full text of article 1, see supra note 9.
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 39 states: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security."
26. See D. Bow-rr, supra note 3. He states:
The purpose of this concept [self-defence] is not, as with aggression, to define the
circumstances in which the competent organs of the collective security will take action to
maintain international peace and security, but rather to define the situations in which the
state, acting without the authorization of those competent organs, may use force to pro-
tect those essential rights on which its security depends.
D. BowErT, supra note 3, at 256. Bowett also states:
[I]t is submitted that in considering whether a situation affords a state the right of
self-defence the only relevant concept is that of self-defence; the concept of aggression, as
it has been elaborated during the course of the last forty years, has an entirely different
purpose and can afford no guide to the question of whether a right of self-defence exists.
D. BowETr, supra note 3, at 261-62.
[Vol. 17:487
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with intense economic coercion. These considerations, however, have
no bearing upon the question of whether such coercion is prohibited by
the Charter. The latter question can be examined only by measuring
the coercion actually used against the provisions of article 2 which set
forth the principles in accordance with which members of the interna-
tional community must act. When this is done, it becomes apparent
that the only relevant concern is the term "force" as used in article 2(4).
The argument that economic coercion, regardless of its intensity,
should never be characterized as impermissible force, since the conse-
quence would be to create a lacuna in the Charter,27 is based on what
will later be suggested is an inaccurate reading of article 51. It will
suffice for the time being to note that a lacuna does not exist if one
accepts the view that the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense
articulated in article 51 is not limited to situations where an "armed"
attack occurs,28 but also encompasses exertions of other forms of im-
permissible coercion. Such a reading of article 51 does not, as a matter
of law, preclude the exercise of self-defense in response to the use of
intense forms of economic coercion. The key consideration in such
cases is whether the coercion jeopardizes those essential security inter-
ests which the Charter protects, not whether the coercion is of an armed
or economic nature.
With respect to the contention that the inclusion of certain forms
of economic coercion in the Charter concept of impermissible force
would give rise to burdensome and even impossible efforts to distin-
guish permissible economic competition from impermissible economic
coercion,29 it is observed that there is in this an element of hyperbole.
At present, whenever a state invokes the right of self-defense as justifi-
cation for resort to force against another, it subjectively determines
whether its response is warranted by "necessity" and whether its action
is "proportionate" to the coercion against which it is directed. These
determinations are subject to subsequent evaluation by the members of
the United Nations whenever called upon to decide the legality of the
resort to self-defense. Since the decision making process undertaken by
both the state invoking article 51 and the United Nations would be
similar whether the question involved the "necessity" of action in self-
defense or the permissibility of the exertion of a certain form of eco-
27. See infra text accompanying notes 39-50.
28. For the arguments supporting this view see infra text accompanying notes 39-50.
29. Supra note 17.
1982]
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nomic pressure,30 it seems that the contention alluded to is nothing
more than an observation of the difficulties of grappling with the vari-
ous aspects of the lawfulness of the invocation of article 51. Difficulty
in determining whether a specific exertion of economic pressure is im-
permissible does not justify refusing to read article 2(4) as encompass-
ing exertions of intense forms of economic pressure. Every exercise of
the right of self-defense involves extremely difficult and troubling
issues.
There are two other reasons, in addition to those just discussed, for
rejecting contentions that the Charter concept of impermissible force
does not include even the most intense forms of economic coercion.
First, the term "force" in article 2(4) is not surrounded by descriptive
adjectives designed to restrict its scope.3' This seems significant when
it is considered that where the drafters of the Charter intended to so
circumscribe the term they removed all ambiguity by either prefacing it
with the adjective "armed," as in article 46,32 or using it in a context
which left no doubt that it meant "armed force," as in article 44.33 Sec-
ond, given the increasing degree of economic interdependence and the
drastic national and international consequences attendant to sudden
and substantial reductions in the availability of certain vital resources,
maintaining that economic coercion, regardless of its intensity, can
never be analogous to armed coercion ignores the realities of modem
existence.34 In many instances a substantial reduction or total cut-off of
vital resources could produce effects far surpassing those which would
warrant a resort to self-defense under article 51 if the coercion causing
the effects were armed. Accordingly, it seems untenable to maintain
that economic coercion, regardless of its intensity, cannot violate the
Charter. The use of any type of particularly intense coercion, even
30. Any determination that the right of self-defense may be, or was, lawfully exercised re-
quires a thorough examination of numerous factors, including the basic nature of the coercion
which precipitated the invocation of the right. Thus, questions dealing with "necessity" invariably
require analysis of the coercion alleged to have led to the use of defensive force.
31. Dempsey, Economic Aggression & Sel-Defense in International Law. The Arab 01
Weapon andAlternative American Responses Thereto, 9 CAsE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 253, 269-70
(1977).
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 46 states: "Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by
the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee."
33. U.N. CHARTER art. 44 states:
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Mem-
ber not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations as-
sumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in
the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that
Member's armed forces.
34. See McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 3, at 1150.
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though it may be economic in nature, against the territorial integrity or
political independence of another state, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the purposes of the United Nations, violates article 2(4).
B. Article 51 and Responses to Impermissible Economic Coercion
Under international law, unilateral resort to military force in self-
defense is justified only if it can be demonstrated that, in addition to
the force being "necessary" and "proportionate" to counter the exer-
tion of some impermissible coercion,35 the circumstances surrounding
its utilization meet the terms of article 51 of the Charter. Article 51
states in pertinent part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed at-
tack occurs . . . until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and se-
curity. Measures taken . . . in the exercise of this right of
self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council ....
There are two traditional schools of thought on the meaning of
article 51. As mentioned at the outset, both should be rejected in favor
of a third reading. One school of thought argues that, as a matter of
law, article 51 cannot be invoked against economic coercion, since,
when read in conjunction with article 2(4), it authorizes the exercise of
35. The principles of "necessity" and "proportionality" have been articulated by McDougal
and Feliciano as follows:
The principal requirements which the "customary law" of self-defense makes prerequi-
site to the lawful assertion of these claims [to use intense coercion] are commonly sum-
marized in terms of necessity and proportionality. For the protection of the general
community against extravagant claims, the standard of required necessity has been ha-
bitually cast in language so abstractly restrictive as almost, if read literally, to impose
paralysis. Such is the clear import of the classical peroration of Secretary of State Web-
ster in the Caroline case-that there must be shown a "necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." The re-
quirement of proportionality which, as we shall develop below, is but another applica-
tion of the principle of economy in coercion, is frequently expressed in equally abstract
terms. One example is M. de Brouckere's formulation: "Legitimate defense implies the
adoption of measures proportionate to the seriousness of the attack and justified by the
imminence of the danger." There is, however, increasing recognition that the require-
ments of necessity and proportionality as ancillary prescriptions (in slightly lower-order
generalization) of the basic community policy prohibiting change by violence, can ulti-
mately be subjected only to that most comprehensive and fundamental test of all law,
reasonableness in particular context. What remains to be stressed is that reasonableness
in particular context does not mean arbitrariness in decision but in fact its exact opposite,
the disciplined ascription of policy import to varying factors in appraising their opera-
tional and functional significance for community goals in given instances of coercion.
McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 3, at 1132.
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self-defense only against "armed" coercion.36 Accordingly, exertions
of force against a state using economic coercion are said to violate arti-
cle 2(4). The second school of thought rejects such a reading of article
51, indicating that nothing in the Charter prohibits the unilateral use of
force which is necessary and proportionate, presumably including, in
extreme situations, the use of military force, if designed to respond to
intense impermissible economic coercion. 37 It would seem that the ef-
fect of this reading would be to characterize as lawful an immediate
resort to unilateral military force whenever the economic coercion
against which it is directed is so intense that the responsive military
force can be said to be necessary and proportionate. In advancing this
position, proponents intimate that it cannot be stated that immediate
resort to necessary and proportionate unilateral military force against
such economic coercion is, as a matter of law, precluded by the
Charter.38
1. Use of Military Force Illegal
There are three reasons for rejecting the view that article 51 autho-
rizes the unilateral resort to military force in self-defense only against
"armed" coercion. First, it is a non sequitur to say that, because article
51 provides that nothing in the Charter forbids or limits the interim
exercise of the inherent right of self-defense against armed coercion, it
must ineluctably follow that self-defense may legitimately be exercised
only against armed coercion. 39 The fact that article 51 provides that
the Charter does not impair the interim exercise of self-defense against
armed coercion does not mean that it prohibits the exercise of self-de-
fense against unarmed forms of coercion. Article 51 is a declaratory
affirmation of the inherent right of self-defense against coercion of an
armed nature, not a renunciation of this right against other forms of
coercion violative of the Charter.
Second, article 51 was not included in the Charter in order to re-
36. See supra note 3.
37. Id
38. It is quite clear that none of the commentators who subscribe to the second school of
thought explicitly state that force may be used immediately against violative economic coercion.
In failing to discuss the applicability of Chapter VI of the Charter, however, it seems safe to
assume that such is their intimation. Given the fact that it is difficult to imagine some type of
economic coercion producing instantly the degree of "necessity" requisite to support lawful mvo-
cation of the right of self-defense, the requirement that a state first seek resolution of the "dispute"
accompanying the exertion of violative economic coercion would provide time for the effects of
the coercion to intensify and thus create the requisite "necessity."
39. D. Bownrr, supra note 3.
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flect the view of the drafters that the inherent right of self-defense as
traditionally known was to be somewhat altered so that in the future
international law would authorize its exercise only against armed coer-
cion.40 Rather, it is widely acknowledged that article 51 was included
in the Charter to assure the continued viability of the inter-American
system of mutual defense established by the Declaration of Lima
(1938),'4 1 the Act of Havana (1940),42 the Act of Chapultepec (1945), 4'
and the, then-anticipated, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assist-
ance (1947). 44 Article 51 was also intended to permit state members of
the inter-American and similar mutual defense organizations to take
forceful measures of collective self-defense whenever the Security
Council was paralyzed by the veto of one of the five permanent mem-
bers.45 Specifically, concern for the inclusion of language like that
found in article 51 stemmed from the fact that the right of self-defense
would have been substantially fettered had Chapter VIII (C)(2) of the
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals46 found its way into the final draft of the
Charter. Chapter VIII (C)(2), considered by the delegates to the Con-
ference on International Organization, provided that forceful measures,
including those in collective self-defense, could not be taken by mutual
defense organizations "without the authorization of the Security Coun-
cil."'47 In essence, this provision required advance Security Council ap-
proval of all measures of collective self-defense, thereby subjecting the
state suffering the impermissible coercion to additional depredation
while the matter was being considered. Further, this provision
presented states belonging to mutual defense organizations with the
possibility of having to act without the necessary Security Council "au-
thorization" as a result of a permanent member's negative vote. Article
51 departs considerably from Chapter VIII (C)(2) of the Dumbarton
40. Under customary international law, the right of self-defense was not limited to exercise
only in response to armed coercion. D. BOWETr, supra note 3.
41. Declaration of Lima, Dec. 27, 1938, 3 BEVANs 534.
42. Act of Havana, July 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 2491, E.A.S. No. 199.
43. Act of Chapultepec, Mar. 8, 1945, 60 Stat. 1831, T.I.A.S. No. 1543.
44. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1858.
45. D. BOWETT, supra note 3, at 297-99; Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-
Interdiction" National and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 335, 362 (1962); McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 3, at 1145-46.
46. Chapter VIII (C)(2) of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provides that, "The Security
Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action
under its authority, but no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by
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Oaks Proposals. As drafted, it does not require mutual defense and
regional security organizations to seek Security council approval before
taking measures of collective self-defense against armed coercion. It
does require, however, that all measures which are taken be subse-
quently reported to the Security Council.
Third, it seems that if it is correct to read article 51 as authorizing
the exercise of self-defense only against armed coercion, then the tran-
scendent principle enunciated in article 2(4)48 should somehow comple-
ment article 51 by characterizing the use of force against forms of
coercion which are not armed as impermissible. In this respect, how-
ever, it must be recalled that the Report of Rapporteur of Committee I
to Commission I states, in relation to article 2(4), that "[t]he use of arms
in legitimate self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired.' 49  The
breadth of this language, which was approved by Commission I and
the Plenary Conference, appears to indicate that the right of self-de-
fense as traditionally known "remains" and may continue to be exer-
cised against all forms of impermissible coercion. Thus the specific
language of article 51 should be read as affirming the right to exercise
self-defense against armed coercion, not as limiting its exercise only to
instances where there has been an exertion of armed coercion. 0 Fur-
thermore, aside from the Rapporteur's illuminating gloss on the rela-
tionship of article 2(4) to article 51, resort to force solely for the
purpose of defending one's own territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence cannot, by definition, involve the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of another.
Therefore, it appears that nothing in the explicit terms of article 2(4)
prohibits the defensive use of force, including "necessary" and "pro-
portionate" military force, against impermissible coercion which is not
armed. It also appears that it was the intention of the delegates to the
Conference on International Organization that article 2(4) not be seen
as impairing the right of self-defense as traditionally conceived.
48. Article 2(4) purports to be a comprehensive statement of all types of force prohibited by
the Charter. The use of force not prohibited by article 2(4) is, therefore, permitted. Cf. D.
BowETrr, supra note 3 at 184-85 ("rights formerly belonging to member states continue except
insofar as obligations inconsistent with those existing rights are assumed under the Charter.")
49. Doc. 885, 1/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 387, 400 (1945) (emphasis added).
50. Had article 2(4) been intended to proscribe the use of force in self-defense against forms
of impermissible coercion not of a military nature, the language of the Report of the Rapporteur
with respect to the effect of article 2(4) on self-defense would have been drafted much more nar-
rowly. The language actually utilized certainly implies that the traditional right of self-defense
was not to be altered or diminished by article 2(4).
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2. Use of Military Force Legal: Traditional and Alternative
Views
The view which intimates that article 51 can be read as authorizing
an immediate resort to unilateral military force whenever the economic
coercion against which it is directed is so intense that the responsive
force can be said to be necessary and proportionate should be rejected,
just like that which insists self-defense may be legitimately exercised
only against armed coercion. This view, held by those who subscribe to
the second school of thought, attributes undue significance to the fact
that the drafters of the Charter did not entertain any intention of alter-
ing the right of self-defense as traditionally conceived. Further, the
view also ignores the language in article 51 implicitly indicating that the
Charter impairs or, for want of a better description, establishes prerequi-
sites which must be sati56ed in advance of resort to the unilateral use of
force in self-defense againstforms of coercion which are not armed This
latter point supplies the foundation for a third reading of article 51.
If one looks closely at the language in article 51 which provides
that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. . . until
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain in-
ternational peace and security," 5' one gets the impression not that the
Charter prohibits, but that something in the Charter impairs or estab-
lishes certain prerequisites to the exercise of the inherent right of self-
defense whenever the coercion against which it is directed is not armed.
Indeed it appears that the precise terms of article 51 are designed to
insulate only the right of self-defense against armed coercion from pos-
sible impairment by certain provisions of the Charter, and are not
designed to protect the right of self-defense against other forms of im-
permissible coercion from those same provisions.52 Given this, it
would be inaccurate to read article 51 as authorizing immediate resort
to military force against impermissible economic coercion, although the
coercion may be so intense that the responsive force would be neces-
sary and proportionate. Rather, the better reading of article 51 would
be that it declares, first, that in instances where an armed attack occurs
51. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
52. As just noted, the opening language of article 51 simply says that the Charter does not
establish any impediment to the right of self-defense "if an armed attack occurs." It would, there-
fore, appear that there are no prerequisites to the use of force in self-defense against armed attack.
This opening language implies, however, that the right of self-defense against other forms of im-
permissible coercion may very well be impaired by the Charter.
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against a state, the state may immediately and unilaterally resort to the
use of force in self-defense, and continue to do so until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security;53 and, second, that in instances where impermissible coer-
cion of some other form is exerted against a state, such as intense eco-
nomic coercion, the state must initially satisfy whatever prerequisites
are found in the Charter before resorting to the unilateral use of force
in self-defense. 4
The cogency of this third, alternative reading of article 51 becomes
apparent when the other provisions of the Charter are scrutinized. Ar-
ticle 2(3), for instance, requires states engaged in international "dis-
putes" to settle them by "peaceful means. '5- This would seem to fix a
duty upon states to peacefully resolve disputes, thereby precluding re-
sort to force in self-defense as a method of resolution before peaceful
efforts have been attempted. In implementation of this adjuration,
Chapter VI of the Charter establishes two obligatory methods of "dis-
pute" settlement which could arguably be seen as the substantive im-
pairments or prerequisites implicitly referred to by the terms of article
51. Specifically, article 33 declares that "parties to any dispute, the con-
tinuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, shall. .. [attempt to resolve the matter by]
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial set-
tlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means .. ."I' Article 37 then states that if efforts to so resolve the
dispute fail, the parties "shall" refer the matter to the Security Council
which "shall," if it determines that the continuance of the dispute is
53. The use of force in self-defense against armed coercion is not subject to certain prerequi-
sites. The right is clearly an interim measure, however, that is, once the Security Council acts to
restore international peace and security, future responsive measures may not be justified as in
accordance with the right of self-defense.
54. Unlike self-defense against armed attack, if a state desires to respond to some other form
of impermissible, violative coercion, it must first satisfy the prerequisites enunciated in the Char-
ter. Thus, there is no interim right identical to that which may be exercised against armed attack.
Once these prerequisites, see infra text accompanying notes 55-57, are satisfied, however, the state
would seem to be entitled to exercise self-defense until the Security Council acts to restore interna-
tional peace and security, see infra text accompanying notes 59-62. For purposes of clarification, it
should again be observed that this Paper focuses on the use of military force against violative
economic coercion. Therefore, no position is taken with respect to the applicability of the afore-
mentioned prerequisites to the use of other forms of defensive force, e.g., retaliatory economic
coercion.
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3 states: "All Members shall settle their international dis-
putes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are
not endangered."
56. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, pare. I (emphasis added).
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likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
"recommend" terms of settlement which it considers appropriate, or,
pursuant to article 36, procedures or methods of adjustment designed
to resolve the matter.5
7
Clearly, while both article 33 and article 37 are activated only by
an international situation which rises to the level of a "dispute", the use
of impermissible economic coercion by one state against another satis-
fies that threshold requirement. After all, since some sort of "dis-
pute"-and article 33 speaks only in terms of "any" dispute-likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security inevita-
bly precedes, accompanies, or follows exertions of force proscribed by
the Charter, the threat or use of economic coercion against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of a state necessarily involves a
"dispute" because such is prohibited by article 2(4).
In light of the affiliation of Chapter VI and article 51 of the Char-
ter, it appears that a state may not immediately resort to the use of force
in self-defense against impermissible economic coercion. The use of
force in self-defense against all but armed forms of impermissible coer-
cion, irrespective of their intensity, appears to be permitted only after
the state which is the target of the coercion has first sought resolution of
the "dispute" under article 33 and, if necessary, article 37 of the Char-
ter. Once such an effort to peacefully resolve the matter has been
made, the target state has fulfilled its obligation under article 2(3) and
may then, and only then, resort to the use of force, including "neces-
sary" and "proportionate" military force, against the impermissible
coercion.
Before leaving the discussion of this alternative reading of article
51, it should be pointed out that any effort by a target state to resolve a
dispute under Chapter VI could produce one of several results: negoti-
ated resolution of the dispute under article 33; a determination by the
Security Council under article 37 that the dispute is not likely to endan-
ger the maintenance of international peace and security; failure of the
Security Council to act under article 37 to resolve a dispute which does
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; or issu-
ance by the Security Council of a "recommendation" setting out the
terms of a settlement or the procedures for resolving the dispute.
A negotiated resolution of the dispute would seem to end the mat-
ter. If a negotiated resolution proves elusive, however, failure of the
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 37.
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Security Council to act under article 37 to resolve a dispute endanger-
ing the maintenance of international peace and security should not pre-
clude the target state from using force in self-defense once it becomes
obvious that the Council is incapable of acting. Article 2(3)58 and
Chapter VI of the Charter obligate a target state to make an earnest
effort to peacefully resolve the dispute bilaterally or through the offices
of the Security Council. Neither should be construed as requiring the
state to continue enduring exertions of impermissible coercion in the
face of Security Council inaction or paralysis. Under such a construc-
tion, the Security Council would be entitled to neglect fulfiling its
raison d' &re which is to "bring about by peaceful means. . adjust-
ment or settlement of international disputes,"59 thereby subjecting the
target state to the consequences of the Council's delinquency.
In instances where the Security Council under article 37 either de-
termines that the dispute is not likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security or acknowledges the likelihood that
such may indeed be endangered and thus issues a "recommendation"
setting out the terms of a settlement or the procedures for resolving the
dispute, it cannot be stressed strongly enough that the state claiming to
be the target of coercion warranting resort to the use of force in self-
defense should proceed with circumspection. This is particularly so
where the state wishes to respond to economic coercion with military
force. Specifically, where the Security Council determines that the dis-
pute is not likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security,60 it would be advisable to reconsider the initial assessment
of the situation before deciding that the coercion justifies the resort to
force in self-defense. The reason for this admonition is that since the
Security Council ultimately determines whether a particular use of
force is justified as an exercise of self-defense, it may prove nearly im-
possible for a state claiming self-defense against economic coercion to
convince the Council of the propriety of its use of force if the Council
previously determined that the dispute which led to the use of the re-
sponsive force was not likely to endanger the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. Undoubtedly, some members of the Security
Council will contend that if the dispute relating to the exertion of eco-
nomic coercion was not "likely to endanger the maintenance of inter-
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
59. U.N. CHARTER art. 1 para. 1. For full text of article I see supra note 9.
60. Technically such a determination only has the effect of preventing the Security Council
from issuing a recommendation under article 37. See U.N. CHARTER art. 37, para. 2.
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national peace and security," then the coercion did not amount to a
"threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence" of a state which would justify the invocation of article 51.
In cases where the Security Council acknowledges that the dispute
endangers the maintenance of international peace and security and acts
to remove the danger by issuing a "recommendation" setting forth the
terms of a settlement or procedures for resolving the dispute, caution
would again seem to dictate great reluctance in resorting to the use of
force in contravention of, or at variance with, the suggested peaceful
settlement. While "recommendations" under Chapter VI are admit-
tedly not binding,6 resort to force in such an instance cannot but help
influence the Security Council's thinking regarding which of the states
involved in the controversy legitimately used force pursuant to the right
of self-defense.
In either of the two aforementioned situations, circumspection is
not intended to serve as an insuperable impediment to the use of force
in legitimate self-defense. It is merely intended to reflect the realities of
the international decision-making process and the preference for peace-
ful methods of dispute resolution.
III. CONCLUSION
This Paper has attempted to demonstrate that the United Nations
Charter does not, as a matter of law, preclude the use of military force
against impermissible economic coercion. As noted at the outset, how-
ever, this does not mean that a state which is the target of such coercion
is always permitted to take up arms in self-defense. To the contrary, in
almost every imaginable' instance the principles of "necessity" and
"proportionality," principles inherent to the right of self-defense, will
make it particularly difficult for a state to demonstrate the lawfulness of
the use of military force against impermissible economic coercion.
Moreover, even in those few instances where resort to some form of
military force can be shown to be both necessary and proportionate, 62
61. Doe. 498, 111/2/19, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 65,66 (1945) (Chapter VIII, section A, of Dum-
barton Oaks Proposals which is now Chapter VI of the Charter). See also statement in Introduc-
tion to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. Doe.
A/4800/Add.1, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1A) (1961) to the effect that "'recommendations'
within the terms of Chapter VI or certain other articles of the Charter" are not binding. U.N.
CHARTER art. 25 specifically says that the binding orders of the Security Council are "decisions."
Article 25 reads: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter" (emphasis added).
62. This Paper has steadfastly refrained from attempting to list specific types of economic
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the state contemplating using such is first required to attempt to peace-
fully resolve the matter in dispute through the methods prescribed by
Chapter VI of the Charter. Immediate resort to military force is unlaw-
ful, regardless that the economic coercion against which it is directed
may be so intense that the responsive force can be said to be necessary
and proportionate.
coercion which warrant resort to military force in self-defense. In order to give one a slight flavor
of the difficulties involved in compiling any such list, however, as well as to indicate that the
principles of "necessity" and "proportionality" require examination of factors too numerous to
enunciate in a brief discussion, a spectrum of possible types of economic coercion, ranked in order
of increasing intensity follows:
1. A total cutoff of all oil from a specific location destined for a country with diversified
supply channels, readily available substitute forms of energy, and relatively wasteful
energy consumption habits.
2. A similar cutoff of all oil destined for a relatively conservation-conscious country
without diversified supply channels and available access to substitute forms of
energy.
3. A complete and intentional termination of all commercial relations imposed by all
trading partners of a country which is largely self-sufficient and trades primarily for
relative commercial advantage.
4. A similar termination imposed by all trading partners of a country which is totally
dependent on international commerce for its very existence.
5. A termination of all shipments of strategic minerals destined for a country primarily
dependent on such outside supplies for the development and maintenance of the
weapons-systems utilized by its defense community.
6. An unprovoked military blockade designed to prevent all ships of foreign registry
from entering the jurisdictional waters of a particular state for the purposes of en-
gaging in commerce.
It is apparent that, while the Charter does not- automatically preclude resort to military force
against any of the types of coercion listed simply because they are not of an armed nature, such a
response would probably stand a greater chance of being in accordance with the Charter and the
principles of "necessity" and "proportionality" if it is directed against a form of coercion near the
lower end of the spectrum.
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